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ABSTRACT
In a complex information system, controlling the access to resources is
challenging. As a new generation of access control techniques, Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC) can provide more flexible and fine-grained access control than RoleBased-Access Control (RBAC). XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language)
is an industrial standard for specifying ABAC policies. XACML policies tend to be
complex because of the great variety of attribute types for fine-grained access control.
This means that XACML policies are prone to errors and difficult to debug. This paper
presents a first attempt at automating the debugging process of XACML policies. Two
techniques are used for this purpose: fault localization and mutation-based policy repair.
Fault localization produces an ordered list of suspicious policy elements by correlating
the test results and the test coverage information. Mutation-based policy repair searches
for potential fixes by mutating suspicious policy elements with predefined mutation
operators. Empirical studies show that the proposed approach is able to repair various
faulty XACML policies with one or two seeded faults. Among the scoring methods for
fault localization that are studied in the experiment, Naish2 and CBI-Inc are the most
efficient.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Background
Access control is a mechanism for regulating user access to resources in an
information system. As information systems are getting more and more complex, it is
highly desirable to separate access control policies from system functionality since the
functionality is subject to frequent changes. Another benefit of the separation is that
access control policies can be changed on the fly without re-compiling.
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) grants or denies access based on various
attributes of authorization elements[1], including predefined characteristics of subjects
(e.g., job title and age), resources (e.g., data, programs, and networks), actions, and
environments (e.g., current time and IP address). Thus ABAC offers a flexible and finegrained access control.
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) is a standard
specification language for ABAC, which was proposed by OASIS [2]. XACML supports
a variety of data types and functions for specifying attributes and their operations. While
XACML policies allows for fine-grained access control, the complexity makes it more
prone to faults caused by misunderstanding of requirements, coding errors during
development and maintenance phase. Faults in XACML policies can cause serious
consequences such as unauthorized accesses or denial of service.
Several methods have been proposed to generate test inputs (i.e., access requests)
from a given XACML policy [3][4][5][6][7][8][9]. The expected responses (or oracle
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values) are determined by examining access control requirements. A policy’s actual
response to a test input is compared with the oracle value. A test fails if the actual
response is different from the oracle.
The debugging of XACML policies can happen in multiple phases in the system
life cycle, including development, maintenance and operation. During the development
phase, tests are created according to access control requirements. Before the deployment
of the system, the tests are executed for verification and validation. During system
maintenance, when security or functional requirements are changed, the XACML policy
is run against the regression tests to find out broken tests or faults introduced by the
changes. After the system is put into operation, there still might be residual faults as
current testing and verification technologies cannot guarantee to eliminate all faults.
When unexpected access control decisions are observed, we can find out the actual access
requests that triggered the residual faults in the system logs. These access requests are
similar to the tests in development and maintenance phases, and can be added to the
regression test suite.
Test failure provides little insight in which element in the XACML policy is
wrong. Actually testing is not concerned with finding out where the faults are and how to
fix them. The activity of finding out faults and fixing them is often referred to as
debugging. Similar to debugging a program, debugging an access control policy can be
difficult and frustrating, especially when the access control logic is complex and the
access control policy is large. Debugging an access control policy often relies on trial and
error, especially when there are multiple faults. Thus a technique that automatically
locates faulty elements in an XACML policy and fixes them is highly desirable.
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Problem Definition
The policy repair problem is formulated as follows: given a faulty XACML policy
(or policy set), along with a test suite where at least one test fails when executed against
the policy (or policy set), make one or more changes to the faulty policy (or policy set) so
that the revised policy will pass all the tests.
The above definition assumes an adequate test suite, which is not always true in
reality. Intuitively, the more adequate the test suite is, the better the policy repair
performs. As mentioned before, the test cases of an XACML policy may come from
policy testing during system development and maintenance or from actual access requests
in an operational system. Each test consists of test input (access request) and oracle value.
The oracle value is used to determine whether the test passes or fails. An access request
consists of attribute names, data types, and values.
It is possible that an attribute name, data type, or value in an access request is
invalid. The response to such a request is typically NotApplicable or Indeterminate. In an
operational system, access requests with invalid attribute names or values may come
from malicious users who attempt to gain unauthorized access or render the system out of
service. During the development and maintenance stages, policy testing should include
not only normal test inputs but also tests with invalid attribute names and values.
In the empirical studies, for each subject policy, tests are generated automatically
to achieve the Multi-Condition/Decision Coverage (MC/DC). MC/DC originated from
NASA’s RTCA/DO-178B document, which requires level-A aviation software to achieve
MC/DC of the software structure [15]. Prior works has applied MC/DC to automatic test
generation of XACML policies in order to achieve high assurance of XACML policies
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[16]. The MC/DC test suite of an XACML policy satisfies the MC/DC of each policy (or
policy set) target, each rule target, and each rule condition. It also includes a test to make
each policy (or policy set) target and each rule to evaluate to error (i.e., to cover the
Indeterminate decisions).
Proposed Approach
The proposed approach to repair a faulty XACML policy includes two major
steps: fault localization and mutation-based repair.
As shown in Figure 1.1, the proposed approach to policy repair is an iterative
process because there might be multiple faults in the faulty policy. The approach first
produces a list of suspicious policy elements by fault localization, and then generates
mutants by applying mutation operators to the ranked suspicious elements, starting from
the most suspicious one. If a mutant is a plausible fix, the process is repeated, otherwise
the next mutant is tried. The repair fails when all mutants have been tried and none of
them is a fix.
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Figure 1.1

Process of Automatic Repair

As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the first step of each iteration is ranking suspicious
elements in a policy. This is accomplished by fault localization. As shown in Figure 1.2,
a faulty policy P and a test suite are given as input. Each test in the test suites consists of
an XACML request and the oracle value (expected decision). Given an XACML policy
and an XACML request as input, XACML engine will output a decision. Test results are
produced by comparing the actual decision and the oracle value. Meanwhile, coverage
information is collected. Then a coverage matrix is built by combining the test results and
coverage information. From the coverage matrix the suspicion score of each policy
element can be calculated using a scoring method. Finally the policy elements are sorted
by their corresponding suspicion scores, producing a sorted list of suspicious elements.
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Figure 1.2

Process of Fault Localization

Chapter 4 will describe illustrate the fault localization, mutation based repair
process in more details with a running example.
Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes related
work about the research topic. Chapter 3 gives an introduction to the structure of
XACML policies, and illustrates it with an example. Chapter 4 describes the proposed
approach with a running example then presents the general process. Chapter 5 elaborates
on the implementation. Chapter 6 reports the empirical studies. Chapter 7 concludes this
paper.
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CHAPTER TWO: RELATED WORK
The existing work on policy debugging focuses on firewall policies. Marmorstein
et al. used failed tests to locate faulty rules in a small firewall policy containing only
several rules [10]. It does not identify faulty rules according to different fault types.
Hwang et al. used failed tests to find the potential faulty rules based on structural
coverage of firewall rules [11]. Two types of faults, wrong decisions and wrong
predicates, were considered. In our approach, both passed and failed tests are used. Chen
et al. proposed an approach to automatic correction of five types of faulty firewall rules:
wrong order, missing rules, wrong predicates, wrong decisions, and wrong extra rules
[12]. Part of this approach converts the given firewall rules into a firewall decision
diagram (FDD) as a compact representation for reasoning about faulty rules. Compared
to firewall rules, XACML policies are much more complex. Firewall rules are defined
over a fixed set of network attributes and primarily specified in propositional logic, while
rules in XACML policies are specified with predicates and functions with various data
types.
Various fault localization techniques have been proposed for software debugging.
This paper has adapted the scoring methods from spectrum-based fault localization (i.e.,
SBFL) for software debugging [13]. A program spectrum is an execution profile that
indicates which parts of a program are active during a run. SBFL analyzes the differences
in program spectra for passed and failed runs. Although the scoring methods in our
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approach are from SBFL, the variables are defined upon firing of policy elements, not
coverage of policy elements.
Several testing methods have been proposed to generate test inputs from XACML
policies [3] [4][5][6][7][8][9]. Testing is concerned with whether or not there are faults,
whereas our work is concerned with how to locate and fix the faults. It is worth pointing
out that the existing testing methods all use policy mutation to evaluate testing
effectiveness. This paper, however, exploits mutation to fix faults. Our prior work has
investigated coverage-based and firing-based approaches to fault localization of XACML
policies [14]. It shows that firing-based fault localization outperforms coverage-based
fault localization. Based on this result, this paper takes a step further to apply firing-based
fault localization to rank policy elements for repair purposes.
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CHAPTER THREE: XACML POLICIES
Structure of XACML Policies
The basic elements in XACML 3.0 language model are policy set, policy, rule,
target, condition and combining algorithm [2]. Figure 3.1 shows the relationships
between the main elements of XACML3.0.

Figure 3.1

Language elements of XACML 3.0[14]

At the root of each XACML document is a policy or policy set. A policy or policy
set defines the circumstances under which whether an access request should be granted.
A policy set contains a target, a combining algorithm, and one or more policies or policy
sets. The target decides if the XACML document is applicable to an access request.
Policy combining algorithms include deny-overrides, permit-overrides,
deny-unless-permit, permit-unless-deny, first-applicable, and
only-one-applicable, etc. The combining algorithms combines the decisions of
individual component policies or policy sets to form a final decision. For example, when
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the combining algorithm is deny-overrides and there is one component policy that
evaluates to Deny, then the authorization decision of the whole policy set will be Deny,
regardless of the decisions of other component policies.
Similarly, a policy contains a target, a combining algorithm, and one or more
rules. A rule is the smallest unit of decision making. In addition to a target, a rule also
contains an effect and a condition. The effect is either Permit or Deny. And the condition
is a boolean expression which refines the applicability. As shown in Table 3.1, given an
access request, the response of a rule can be Permit, Deny, NotApplicable or
Indeterminate. The response is NotApplicable when the access request doesn’t match
with the target or condition of the rule. And the response is Indeterminate only when an
error occurs during the evaluation.
Table 3.1

Response of a Rule

target

condition

effect

response

false

-

-

NotApplicable

true

false

-

NotApplicable

true

true

Permit

Permit

true

true

Deny

Deny

In addition, a rule, policy, or policy set may have one or more obligation or advice
expressions. This paper will not discuss about obligation and advice as they are irrelevant
to the topic.
A Sample XACML Policy
Figure 3.2 shows an example XACML policy named KmarketBluePolicy (line 2).

11

Figure 3.2

A Sample XACML Policy

The rule combining algorithm is deny-overrides (line 2). The policy’s target
(lines 3-12) means role=”blue”, where role is an attribute in the subject
category and its type is string. There are four rules: total-amount (line 13),
deny-liquor-medicine (line 31), max-drink-amount (line 57), and permitrule (line 85). The policy target and rules are summarized in plain text in Table 3.2.
The policy target (denoted as PT) is role=”blue”. For rule total-amount, its
effect is Permit, its target is totalAmount>100, and its condition is omitted. Its
decision would be Permit if totalAmount>100 evaluates to true. Similarly, rule
deny-liquor-medicine would result in a Deny decision if resourceid>Liquor ∨ resource-id=Medicine evaluates to true. Rule max-drinkamount has both target and condition components. Its decision would be Deny if both
its target and condition evaluate to true (i.e., resource-id=Drink ∧ amount>10).
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Rule permit-rule has neither a target nor a condition. It results in a Permit decision
whenever it is applied.
Table 3.2

Main Policy Elements in the Sample Policy

Policy Element

Target

Condition

Effect

Policy Target(PT)

role = Blue

-

total-amount

totalAmount > 100

-

Permit

deny-liquormedicine

Resource-id > “liquor”
∨ resource-id =
“medicine”

-

Deny

max-drink-amount

Resource-id = “drink”

account > 10

Deny

permit-rule

-

-

Permit

Similar to the case of policy set, the authorization decision of a policy depends
not only on the target and rules, but also on the rule combining algorithm. In this
example, if the rule deny-liquor-medicine evaluates to Deny, the whole policy
will evaluates to Deny, as the rule combining algorithm is deny-overrides. In such
case, the remaining rules in the policy will be skipped since their decision won’t affect
the overall decision.
Note that although Policy Decision Point (PDP) outputs only 3 kind of decisions:
Permit, Deny and Indeterminate, internally Indeterminate is divided into 3 different
decisions: Indeterminate {P}, Indeterminate {D} and Indeterminate {DP}. A rule or
policy produces a Indeterminate {P} when an error occurred during evaluation, and the
decision would be Permit if the error had not occurred. Similarly, a rule or policy
produces a Indeterminate {D} when an error occurred during evaluation, and the decision
would be Deny if the error had not occurred. An Indeterminate {DP} is produced when
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Indeterminate {P} and Indeterminate {D} are combined. To make full use of coverage
information from the PDP, all 6 kinds of decisions are used and a strict matching strategy
is adopted, e.g. a test is deemed as failed if the oracle is Indeterminate {D} and the actual
result is Indeterminate {P}.
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CHAPTER FOUR: AUTOMATIC REPAIR OF XACML POLICIES
A Running Example
Consider the sample XACML policy in Chapter 3. It has two faults:
a.

The effect of rule total-amount should be Deny, not Permit;

b.

The target of rule deny-liquor-medicine should be resourceid=“Liquor” ∨ resource-id=“Medicine”, not resourceid>“Liquor” ∨ resource-id=“Medicine”.

The original version of KmarketBluePolicy is one of the policies in a
demonstration application of Balana [17], which is currently the only open-source
implementation of XACML 3.0.
Table 4.1 shows the MC/DC test suite generated automatically from the correct
version of KmarketBluePolicy by the open source XPA (XACML Policy Analyzer) tool1.
The valid attribute names in access requests are role, resource-id, amount, and
totalAmount. A test input may also consist of invalid attribute names and their
attribute values. In Table 4.1, there are seven tests where all attribute names are valid.
Each of the remaining tests (Test 1, 3, 5, 10) includes an invalid attribute name. The
invalid attribute names are generated randomly to produce error conditions when the
policy is tested. In this case, XPA simply uses Indeterminate as the attribute value, which
indicates that an error occurrence is expected during policy testing.

1

https://github.com/dianxiangxu/XPA. It includes the policies and test suites used in this paper.
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Table 4.1

Test suite for the sample policy
Input (attribute names and values in request)

No

role

resource-id

amount

total
Amount

nzocphnmz1,
Indeterminate

1
2
3

ak

0

Blue

0

Oracle
Value

invalid attribute, value

NotApplicable
NotApplicable

6m9dv7gdw6,
Indeterminate

Indeterminate
{DP}
Permit

j4yxpw95g1,
Indeterminate

Blue

k

0

Blue

Drink

0

6

Blue

Drink

0

0

Indeterminate
{DP}
Permit

7

Blue

Drink

11

0

Deny

8

Blue

Liquor

0

Deny

9

Blue

Medicine

0

Deny

4
5

10
11

Blue
Blue

o5eqqyvjdx,
Indeterminate
101

Indeterminate
{DP}
Deny

When the test suite in Table 4.1 is executed with the sample policy in Chapter 2,
Test 5, 6, 8, and 11 shall fail. Consider Test 11, where role=”Blue” and
totalAmount=101, the oracle value is Deny. However, the actual response of the
faulty policy is Permit because the effect of rule total-amount is Permit.
The goal is to repair the given KmarketBluePolicy policy such that the revised
policy will pass all the tests in Table 4.1. Ideally, the revised policy will be identical to
the original KmarketBluePolicy in Balana’s Kmarket demonstration application.
The first step is to determine the policy elements (including the policy target, and
individual rules, and the rule combining algorithm) that likely contain the faults. This is
achieved by ranking all policy elements according to their suspicion scores obtained from
the correlation between the firing information of policy elements and the test execution
results (i.e., pass and fail). The higher the score, the more likely that the policy element is
faulty.
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A policy target (or policy set target) is said to be fired by a test if it is evaluated to
true when the test is executed. A rule is said to be fired by a test if its target and condition
are both evaluated to true when the test is executed. Note that the rule combining
algorithm will always be evaluated. Therefore, the firing information of rule combining
algorithm is not meaningful. Its suspicion score can be defined in different ways (e.g.,
highly suspicious or least suspicious). For simplicity, herein the rule combining algorithm
is treated as the most suspicious element in a policy and attempts to change the rule
combining algorithm first. The reason is that the number of repair attempts is small as
there are only 11 rule combining algorithms.
Table 4.2
Test
No

Firing of the policy target and rules in the sample policy

PT

Firing of policy target and rules
totaldeny-liquor- max-drinkamount
medicine
amount

permitrule

Test
Result

1

Pass

2

Pass

3

x

x

Pass

4

x

x

Pass

5

x

x

Fail

6

x

x

Fail

7

x

x

Pass

8

x

9

x

10

x

11

x

x

Starantula

0.583

1.0

x
x

0.636

Fail
Pass

0.0

x

Pass

x

Fail

0.538

Table 4.2 shows the firing information of the policy target and each rule in the
sample policy when the test suite in Table 4.1 is executed, where ‘x’ means that the
policy element in the given column is fired by the test in the given row. The set of failed
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tests is {Test 5, Test 6, Test 8, Test 11}. To correlate policy elements with test results, the
following four variables are associated with each policy element:


𝑎00 : number of passed tests in which the policy element was not fired



𝑎01 : number of failed tests in which the policy element was not fired



𝑎10 : number of passed tests in which the policy element was fired



𝑎11 : number of failed tests in which the policy element was fired

For each policy element, the subscript 𝑖 in 𝑎𝑖𝑗 refers to whether the policy element
is fired (𝑖 =1) or not (𝑖 =0), whereas 𝑗 is concerned with the number of passed tests (𝑗 =0)
or failed tests (𝑗 =1). For each policy element, a suspicion score is calculated by feeding
𝑎𝑖𝑗 to a scoring method and then sort all policy elements in the descending order of their
scores. For example, the suspicion scores of the policy target and rules in Table 4.2 are
0.583, 1.0, 0.636, 0, and 0.538, respectively when the following Tarantula scoring
method [18] is applied:

𝑆𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑙𝑎

𝑎11
𝑎11 + 𝑎01
=
𝑎11
𝑎10
𝑎11 + 𝑎01 + 𝑎10 + 𝑎00

The resultant ranking is <total-amount, deny-liquor-medicine, PT, permit-rule,
max-drink-amount >. Then the rule combining algorithm (denoted as CA) is put at the
beginning of the rankings. Therefore, the complete suspicion ranking of all policy
elements is <CA, total-amount, deny-liquor-medicine, PT, permit-rule, max-drinkamount>.
Next step would be repairing the faulty policy according to the suspicion rankings
of the policy elements. The faulty policy is repaired by changing the suspicious policy
elements, starting from the most suspicious one. Herein the action of changing a policy is
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referred as policy mutation and a revised policy as a policy mutant. Policy mutation is
performed by applying predefined mutation operators to the current policy. Mutation
operators are defined with respect to the constructs of policy elements. Table 4.3 shows
the mutation operators used in the current approach. Each operator aims at fixing a
particular type of faults in a policy element.
Table 4.3

Mutation operators and target faults.

Operator
Change Rule Combining
algorithm (CRC)
Change Rule Effect
(CRE)
Add Negation Function
(ANF)
Remove Negation
Function (RNF)
Replace Comparison
Function (RCF)
Change Comparison
Function (CCF)

Meaning
Replace the existing rule combining
algorithm with another rule
combining algorithm
Change the rule effect by replacing
permit with deny or deny with
permit
add the not function as the first
function of a rule condition element
Remove the not function in a rule
condition
Replace the comparison function in
a target with a different one
Change a comparison function in
rule condition

Fault to be fixed
Wrong rule combining algorithm

Wrong rule effect

Missing negation in a condition
element
Extra negation in a condition
element
Wrong comparison function in
target
Wrong comparison function in
rule condition

In the above example, the rule combining algorithm is assumed to be the most
suspicious element. So the mutation operator CRC (change rule combining algorithm) is
applied to the faulty policy first. Consider changing the rule combining algorithm from
deny-overrides to permit-overrides. The resultant policy mutant is denoted
as CRC1. Run the test suite against CRC1 and CRC1 will fail the following set of tests
{Test 3, Test 5, Test 7, Test 8, Test 9, Test 10, Test 11}. Apparently CRC1 is not a valid
repair. As it is unknown how many faults are there in the policy, however, CRC1 might
be a step toward the right direction or it might have introduced another fault. In the
former case, the debugging process should be repeated until the faulty policy is repaired
successfully. In the latter case, we would want to give it up and try other policy mutants.
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Assuming that multiple faults in the same policy are independent, whether or not the
mutation is in the right direction can be determined by examining the set of failed tests.
The mutant is considered to be a plausible intermediate fix if the set of tests failed by the
policy mutant is a subset of the tests failed by the faulty policy before the mutation.
Apparently, CRC1 is not a plausible fix because it fails more tests than the example
faulty policy does. As there are other candidate rule combining algorithms, we continue
to create new CRC mutants and evaluate if any of these mutants is a plausible fix.
For KmarketBluePolicy, it turns out that none of the CRC mutants is a plausible
fix. So now all possible attempts about the most suspicious policy element are completed.
Now we move on to the next candidate element – the rule total-amount. Since a rule
has several components (target, condition, and effect), there can be a number of
applicable mutation operators. For simplicity, here we first consider the mutation
operator CRE (change rule effect). The mutant after applying CRE to the rule totalamount is denoted as CRE1, where the rule effect is changed from permit to deny.
Running the test suite against CRE1 will result in the following set of failed tests: {Test
5, Test 6, Test 8}, as shown in Table 4.4. This is a subset of the failed tests in Table 4.2.
Thus, CRE1 is a plausible fix. Then we continue to apply the above debugging process to
CRE1. Specifically, we create new suspicion rankings of the policy elements in CRE1
except for the rule combining algorithm because it is already shown non-promising as
discussed before. According to Table 4.4, the suspicion rankings are <deny-liquormedicine, PT, permit-rule, total-amount, max-drink-amount>.
Table 4.4
Test
No

PT

Suspicion scores of policy elements in CRE1
totalamount

Firing of policy elements
deny-liquor- max-drinkmedicine
amount

permitrule

Test
Result
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1

Pass

2

Pass

3

x

x

Pass

4

x

x

Pass

5

x

x

Fail

6

x

x

Fail

7

x

x

Pass

8

x

9

x

10

x

11

x

x

Starantula

0.571

0.0

x
x

Fail
Pass

x

Pass
Pass

0.727

0.0

0.471

Now the repair attempt focuses on the rule deny-liquor-medicine in
CRE1. The applicable mutation operators are CRE (change rule effect) and RCF (replace
comparison function in target). CRE is not promising. Instead, a RCF mutant that
replaces the function “string-greater-than” to “string-equal” will pass all the tests. This
mutant, named CRE1_RCF2_1, is a successful repair of the faulty policy
KmarketBluePolicy. And it is identical to the original policy KmarketBluePolicy.
General Process for Automatic Policy Repair
Figure 1.1 shows the general process of automatic policy repair. The two key
techniques of automatic policy repair are fault localization and mutation-based repair.
Fault localization aims to rank all policy elements according to their suspicion scores
obtained from the correlation between the firings of policy elements and the test results.
In the running example, the Tarantula scoring method is used. In fact, there are various
scoring methods. Table 4.5 summarizes the scoring methods implemented in the
proposed approach. Tarantula [18] is one of the pioneer tools for software fault
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localization. Naish2 and CBI-Inc are among the best performing methods for software
fault localization, whereas Sokal is among the average ones [13]. These representative
methods are adapted for use in the fault localization of XACML policies and their
performance are compared from the perspective of automatic policy repair.
Mutation-based repair applies mutation operators to each suspicious policy
element in order to find an intermediate or final fix. If a policy mutant passes all the tests,
it is a final fix. In this case, the faulty policy has been repaired successfully. If a policy
mutant fails some tests that are a subset of the failed tests before the mutation, it is
considered a plausible intermediate fix in the right direction. In this case, we continue to
apply the debugging process to the policy mutant. However, if no fix is found for the
current suspicious element after applying all mutation operators, the next suspicious
policy element is selected for further mutation. If no fix is found after all policy elements
have tried, then the faulty policy cannot be repaired by the approach.
Table 4.5
Method Name
CBI-Inc
Naish2
Sokal
Tarantula

Scoring methods for fault localization
Formula
𝑎11
𝑎11 + 𝑎01
−
𝑎11 + 𝑎10 𝑎11 + 𝑎01 + 𝑎10 + 𝑎00
𝑎10
𝑎11 −
𝑎10 + 𝑎00 + 1
2(𝑎11 + 𝑎00 )
2(𝑎11 + 𝑎00 ) + 𝑎01 + 𝑎10
𝑎11
𝑎11 + 𝑎01
𝑎11
𝑎10
+
𝑎11 + 𝑎01 𝑎10 + 𝑎00

The proposed approach is not intended to repair all possible faulty policies
automatically due to the theoretical and implementation challenges. Automatic policy
repair essentially tries to search all possible mutants of the faulty policy. For a policy
with 𝑛 faults, the mutation operators may be applied to each policy element for up to 𝑛
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times. The number of possible mutants grows exponentially with the number of faults
(i.e., the number of repetitions that mutation is applied). For a multi-fault policy with a
large number of policy elements, it could be too slow to be of practical use when no fix
can be found. The proposed approach can estimate remaining time, and allows using a
predefined timeout to terminate the search. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the
empirical studies, our approach can repair faulty XACML policies with one or two
seeded faults.
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CHAPTER FIVE: IMPLEMENTATION
This chapter presents how the proposed approach to policy repair is implemented.
The program architecture consists of four major components: Coverage Analysis,
Fault Localization, Mutation, and Repairing.
Coverage Analysis
The component Coverage Analysis deals with running tests and collecting
coverage information. There are four modules in this component: Coverage,
TestSuite, PolicyCoverageFactory, and PolicyTracer. Figure 5.1 shows
the UML class diagram of this component.
Coverage
The coverage information of rules and targets are defined differently, so there are
two kinds of coverage information: RuleCoverage and TargetCoverage. They are
modeled as two classes and they both extend the abstract class Coverage, so that both
kind of coverage information can be handled in a uniformed way.
There can be only three evaluation results of a target: MATCH, NOT_MATCH and
INDETERMINATE. The evaluation result is INDETERMINATE when an error occurred
during the evaluation. If no error occurred during the evaluation, and the target is
evaluated to be true, the evaluation result is MATCH, otherwise it is NOT_MATCH. So
evaluation result of a target is modeled as Enum type TargetMatchResult.
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The coverage information of a rule is more complex as a rule has a target and a
condition, the coverage of which must be both taken into account. As summarized in
Table 3.1, when a rule is evaluated, the target is evaluated first, and the condition is
evaluated only if the target is evaluated to be true.

Figure 5.1

UML Class Diagram of Package Coverage

The evaluation results of an individual target and condition can be defined in a
uniformed way: The result is TRUE if the target or condition is evaluated to be true;
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FALSE if it is evaluated to be false; ERROR if an error occurred during evaluation. And
there are two additional cases: EMPTY if the target or condition is an empty element,
which can be regarded as a special case of TRUE; NOT_EVALUATED if the target or
condition is not touched by the test. A target is not touch if the evaluation has finished
before this target is reached. A condition is not touched if the result of the target is
FALSE or ERROR. This uniformed representation of evaluation results is modeled as
Enum type IntermediateCoverage.
The coverage information of a rule is a combination of that of the target and
condition in that rule. Rule coverage can be defined in two ways, with different
granularity.
One way is to define it in the same way as in Table 3.1, except that the result
would be INDETERMINATE if an error occurred during the evaluation of either the
target or the condition. This is modeled by Enum type RuleDecisionCoverage.
Another definition is more fine grained: the result is FALSE_TARGET if the
target is evaluated to be false; FALSE_CONDITON if the condition is evaluated to be
false; ERROR_TARGET if an error occurred during the evaluation of the target;
ERROR_CONDITON if an error occurred during the evaluation of the condition;
BOTH_TRUE if both are evaluated to be true. This is modeled in Enum type
CombinedCoverage.
TestSuite
The module TestSuite models a test suite generated from an XACML policy.
It consists of a list of XACML requests and a list of corresponding oracle values. Each
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pair of request and oracle value is a test. In addition, a list of request notes is defined in
the class to ease debugging. A request note is used as an annotation of a request.
A test suite can be created from the code that generates test suites from XACML
policies or loaded from hard drive. The second way allows users to load previously saved
auto-generated tests, or to load manually created tests, which is handy for debugging
purpose. A saved test suite consists of a CSV file and some XACML request files. In the
CSV file, in the first column are file paths to requests, which are XML files, and in the
second column are oracle values.
The runTests() method runs the test suite on an XACML policy, and it calls
the private method runTest() to run a single test in the test suite. Both methods are
instrumented by AspectJ to collect coverage information while the tests are running.
runTest() in turn calls PolicyRunner.evaluate() to evaluate an XACML
request against an XACML policy.
PolicyCoverageFactory and XpathSolver
The PolicyCoverageFactory module is a “global variable” to store
coverage information. All the data and method members in this module are static.
PolicyCoverageFactory has a coverageMatrix to store a matrix of
Coverage objects. The number of rows is equal to the number of tests in the
TestSuite, and the number of columns is equal to the number of policy elements in
the XACML policy. An example of coverageMatrix is the one in Table 4.2.
PolicyCoverageFactory also has results, a list of booleans, to store test
results. The size of results is equal to number of tests in the TestSuite.
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PolicyCoverageFactory.init() is called when a test suite starts to run,
and initialize the coverageMatrix with an empty list. The newRow() method is called
when a test starts to run, and adds a new row in the coverageMatrix. The
addCoverage() method is called when a policy element is touched by a test, and
inserts a Coverage object to the last row in the coverageMatrix.
When adding the Coverage of a policy element to the coverageMatrix, we
need to know which column to add the Coverage object to, so a mapping from each
policy element to a column in the coverageMatrix is needed. And this is the purpose
of the data member mapping in the PolicyCoverageFactory.
The coverageMatrix has a flat structure in which one policy element
corresponds to a row in the coverageMatrix. However XACML policies have a
hierarchical structure: a policy set contains a policy set target, and one or more policies or
policy sets; a policy contains a policy target, and one or more rules. Therefore the
structure of XACML policies must be “flattened” when mapping a policy element to a
column in the coverageMatrix.
Simply giving each policy element an index number in the order they are visited
while traversing over the XACML policy will not work. This is because the XACML
engine might have implemented short-circuit evaluation (the balana implementation does
have), so some policy element might be skipped when evaluating a request. For example,
if an XACML policy is a policy set that consists of two policies: Policy1 and Policy2.
There are two rules in Policy1: Rule1 and Rule2. And the rule combining algorithm of
Policy1 is first-applicable. Suppose for a given request, Rule1 is fired(both target and
condition are evaluated to be true), then the XACML engine will skip Rule2, and go on
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evaluating Policy2. In such scenario, the coverage information of the following policy
elements will be written to the wrong columns in the coverageMatrix.
This is solved by mapping each policy element’s XPath to its column index.
XPath is a part of the XSLT standard. It uses path expressions to select a node an XML
document. For example, the first rule in the sample XACML policy in Figure 3.1 can be
selected by the absolute XPath “/*[local-name()=’PolicySet’ and
@PolicySetId=’KMarketBluePolicy’]/*[local-name()=’Rule’ and
@RuleId=’total-amount’]”. The XPath expression means that starting from the root

node, first look for a node whose local-name is “PolicySet”, and has an attribute
“PolicySetId” that equals to “’KMarketBluePolicy”; then from the child nodes of this
node, look for a node whose local-name is “Rule”, and has an attribute “RuleId” that
equals to “total-amount”. The “*” in the XPath expression means ignoring namespace
prefix. The first rule can also be selected by the relative XPath “//*[localname()=’Rule’ and @RuleId=’total-amount’]”. The double slash at the

beginning of the path expression means that this is a relative path so the node is not
necessarily a child of the root node.
According to the specifications of XACML, the policy element ID attribute must
be unique in an XACML policy. So each policy element can be uniquely identified by its
local-name and policy element ID attribute, and only one node will be selected even if
using relative XPath. And since there is no getParent() method in PolicySet, Policy,
Rule classes in the Balana implementation of XACML engine, it is impossible to
construct an absolute XPath from a policy element. Therefore, the relative XPath is used
for mapping policy elements to column indices.

29
The module XpathSolver in the component PolicyUtils is used for
getting the XPath of policy elements in an XACML policy. Figure 5.2 shows the UML
class diagram of XpathSolver. The method
getEntryListRelativeXPath(Document) returns XPath strings of all policy
elements in the order they are visited in a recursive traversal of the XACML document.
PolicyCoverageFactory.init() uses this method to set the mapping, thus
getting a mapping from XPath of each policy element to their column index in the
coverageMatrix. Latter while the tests are running, each time a policy element is
touched by a test, the column index of the policy element is looked up in the mapping,
and a Coverage object is created and inserted at the column index in the last row.

Figure 5.2

UML Class Diagram of XpathSolver
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PolicyTracer
PolicyTracer is used to change the behavior of some methods related to the
evaluation of XACML requests in the XACML engine for the purpose of collecting
coverage information. This functionality is accomplished with AspectJ. AspectJ is an
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) extension for Java. The aim of AOP is to increase
modularity by putting code that is not central to business logic and appears multiple
places into one module, e.g. logging.
Basic concepts in AspectJ include join points, pointcuts, and advices. A join point
is a point in a program where additional code can be joined into, e.g. method execution,
object initialization, field read and write. A pointcut is an expression that matches one or
more joint points. For example, in the PolicyTracer code shown in Figure 5.3, line 45-47
defines a pointcut called runNewTestSuite, which matches the runtTests()
method in the TestSuite class. An advice is a piece of code that runs before, after or
around a join point that matches a pointcut. During execution, when a joint point matches
a pointcut, the AspectJ runtime automatically invokes the advice associated with the
pointcut. In Figure 5.3, line 49-53 is an advice associated with the pointcut
runNewTestSuite. Therefore, before TestSuite.runTests() is called, a
message is written to log and PolicyCoverage.init() is called.
Figure 5.3 shows the source code of PolicyTracer. The advice associated with
ruleEvaluationPointCut is omitted to save space.
Line 35-43 defines a pointcut runNewTest and an associated advice that calls
PolicyCoverageFactory.newRow(), adding a new row in the
coverageMatrix before every test starts.
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Line 15-27 defines an advice that gets the XPath of a policy target or policy set
target, creates a Coverage object, and calls addCoverage() to add the Coverage
object into coverageMatrix.
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Figure 5.3

Source code of PolicyTracer

Line 4-12 defines a pointcut ruleEvaluationPointCut and an associated
advice that gets the XPath of a rule, creates a Coverage object, and calls
addCoverage() to add the Coverage object into coverageMatrix.
Line 55-55 defines an advice that calls
PolicyCoverageFactory.setResults() to add the test results of the test suite
to PolicyCoverageFactory.testResults after TestSuite.runTests()
has finished.
Fault Localization
The component Fault Localization deals with fault localization. Figure
5.4 shows the UML diagram of this package.
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Figure 5.4

UML Class Diagram of Component Fault Localization

The module SpectrumBasedFaultLoclizer calculates a suspicion score
for each policy element basing on the coverage matrix and test results. The coverage
information defined in the Coverage are Enum types. In order to calculate a score, the
values in the Enum types must be mapped to numbers. There can be different ways for
the mapping. In our implementation the “firing” criteria is used: a policy target or a
policy set target is fired if it is evaluated to be true; a rule is fired only if both the rule
target and condition are evaluated to be true. In TargetMatchResult, MATCH is
mapped to 1, other values are mapped to 0; in RuleDecisionCoverage,EFFECT is
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mapped to 1, other values are mapped to 0. In addition, test results also need to be
mapped to numbers. If a test passes, the test result is mapped to 1, otherwise mapped to 0.
The mapping is done in the constructor of
SpectrumBasedFaultLocalizer. The coverageMatrix in
PolicyCoverageFactory is mapped to
SpectrumBasedFaultLocalizer.matrix, and testResults in
PolicyCoverageFactory. is mapped to
SpectrumBasedFaultLocalizer.verdicts.
Fourteen scoring methods are implemented. For example jaccard()
implements the scoring method jaccard. In the empirical study of fault localization,
sometimes it is desirable to be able to loop over a list of scoring methods. As in Java
language methods are not first class functions, this is implemented by way of reflection.
The method applyFaultLocalizeMethod(String) takes a scoring method
name as input, and invoke the scoring method using reflection.
PolicyElementCoefficient bundles the index, suspicion score and rank
of a policy element together, and used by SpectrumBasedDiagnosisResults,
which evaluates the effectiveness of a scoring method. The constructor of
SpectrumBasedDiagnosisResults sorts the policy elements by their suspicion
score and calls rankSuspicion(List<PolicyElementCoefficient>) to
give each policy element a rank according to their suspicion score. For example, suppose
the suspicion scores of 4 policy elements are [0.5, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1], then the rank of them is
[1, 2, 2, 4]. The method getNumberOfElementsToInspect(int) evaluates a
scoring method by calculating how many policy element must be inspected in the worst
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case before the faulty policy element is found out. The input of this method is the index
of the faulty policy element. For example, suppose in the previous example the second
policy element is faulty, in the worst case three policy element must be inspected before
it is found out. And the method
getAverageNumberOfElementsToInspect(List<Integer>) calculates
when there are multiple faulty policy elements, on average how many policy elements
must be inspected in the worst case. Similarly, the input of this method is a list of indices
of the faulty policy elements.
The FaultLocalizationExperiment is for empirical study of the
performance of different scoring methods. It first generates or loads from hard drive a list
of mutants, then perform fault localization on each mutant, using several scoring
methods, and writes the number of policy elements to inspect of each pair of mutant and
scoring method to a CSV file. And in the last row of the CSV file, it appends the average
number of policy elements to inspect of each scoring method.
Mutation
The component Mutation deals with mutating XACML policies. Figure 5.5
shows the UML class diagram of package mutation.
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Mutant

Figure 5.5

UML Class Diagram of Component Mutation

Mutant models a policy mutant. In the Balana implementation of XACML
engine, Policy class models a policy, and PolicySet class models a policy set. And
they both extends the AbstractPolicy class. A mutant is an XACML policy too. So
the Mutant class should have all the public methods and fields of AbstractPolicy.
Besides that, a mutant has faulty policy element, so Mutant should have a field that
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stores the indices of faulty policy elements, and a getter method for the field. Meanwhile,
a mutant is created by mutating either a policy or a policy set, so a Mutant should
behave like either a Policy or a PolicySet, depending on which one it was created
from. Henceforth, Mutant is designed to extend the AbstractPolicy, and to have
an AbstractPolicy as data member, which can be an instance of Policy or
PolicySet. All the public methods of the data member are “forwarded” to inherited
methods. Figure 5.6 shows a simplified UML class diagram of these four classes. And
Mutant has a faultLocations field which stores the indices of faulty policy
elements, and a getter method for the field.

Figure 5.6

Simplified UML Class Diagram of AbstractPolicy, Policy, PolicySet
and Mutant

Mutator
The Mutator module is used for creating mutants from a Policy, a
PolicySet or a Mutant.
All the public methods starting with “create” in Mutator are methods
implementing a mutation operator. For example,
createRuleEffectFlippingMutants(String) implements the CRE mutation
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operator in Table 4.3, which changes the effect of a rule from Permit to Deny, or vice
versa.
Because there are too many mutation operators, only a few typical mutation
operators’ implementation is described in this paper.

createCombiningAlgorithmMutants(xpathString)
mutants = an empty list
policyNode = xpath.evaluate(xpathString)
originalCombiningAlgo = get rule combining algorithm of policyNode
for each rule combining algorithm algo:
if algo is not equal to originalCombiningAlg
set rule combining algorithm in policyNode to be algo
create a mutant and add to mutants
set rule combining algorithm in policyNode to be originalCombiningAlg
return mutants
Figure 5.7

Implementation of CRC

Figure 5.7 shows how the mutation operator CRC is implemented.
createRuleEffectFlippingMutants (xpathString)
mutants = an empty list
ruleNode = xpath.evaluate(xpathString)
originalEffect = get effect of ruleNode
if originalEffect is equal to “Permit”
set effect of ruleNode to “Deny”
else
set effect of ruleNode to “Permit”
create a mutant and add to mutants
set effect of ruleNode to be originalEffect
return mutants
Figure 5.8

Implementation of CRE
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Figure 5.8 shows how the mutation operator CRE is implemented.
createTargetTrueMutants(xpathString)
mutants = an empty list
targetNode = xpath.evaluate(xpathString)
childNodes = an empty list
remove all child nodes of targetNode and add into childNodes
create a mutant and add to mutants
add all nodes in childNodes into targetNode
return mutants
Figure 5.9

Implementation of PTT and RTT

Figure 5.9 shows how PTT (Policy Target True) and RTT (Rule Target True) is
implemented. Note that the code makes use of the XACML specification that an empty
target is always evaluated to be true.
From the above examples we can see that generally implementing a mutation
operator takes three steps: find the node to change and store its state; change the node and
create a mutant from the changed document; restore the node.
Repairing
The component Repairing deals with repairing faulty policy elements. Figure
5.10 shows the UML class diagram of this component.
The module PolicyRepairer repairs a faulty policy or policy set. The method
repairSmartly(PolicyMutant, String) repairs a faulty policy or policy set
by performing fault localization, generating mutants and looking for a mutant that passes
all tests. Figure 1.1 describes this process. Chapter 4 has a running example of this
process.
The mutation-based repair traverses a tree where the root is the faulty policy and
each node is a policy mutant. As the tree can be very large, it is pruned by excluding
those branches that are unlikely leading to a successful repair. If the policy mutant in the
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current node passes all the tests, the repair is successful. If the set of tests failed by the
policy mutant is a subset of those failed by its parent, this mutant is considered an
intermediate fix. In this case, the current node shall be expanded, i.e., apply fault location
and mutation to the mutant. If this mutant is not an intermediate or final fix, the node will
not be expanded.
Another implementation issue is the order of mutation operators in which they are
applied to the sorted policy elements. We use (𝑃𝐸𝑖 ) to denote the set of mutants resulted
from applying mutation operators to the 𝑖-th suspicious policy element. When we run
tests against the mutants in the set (𝑃𝐸𝑖 ) and apply mutation operators to the j-th
suspicious policy element, the resultant set of mutants are denoted as (𝑃𝐸𝑖 , 𝑃𝐸𝑗 ). For
(𝑃𝐸𝑖1 , 𝑃𝐸𝑖2 , … , 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑛 ), the lesser (𝑖1 + 𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝑖𝑛 )is, the more suspicious this set of
mutants are. This is handled by a priority queue.
The method repairRandomOrder(PolicyMutant) follows a similar
process except that the list of suspicious policy element is not obtained from fault
localization, but generated randomly. And repairOneByOne(PolicyMutant) is
similar except that the list of suspicious policy elements is in the order they are in the
XACML policy.
The module ExperimentOnRepair performs experiment on repairing of an
XACML policy with only one faulty element. And the module
ExperimentMultiFault performs experiment on repairing of an XACML policy
with one or more faulty elements. The module MutantNode is used as a node in the
priority queue during repairing an XACML policy with one or more faulty elements.
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Figure 5.10

UML Class Diagram of Component Repairing
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CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRICAL STUDIES
The empirical studies aim to answer the following research questions: (a) Can
faulty XACML policies be repaired automatically? (2) How do the various scoring
methods for suspicion rankings affect time performance of automatic policy repair?
In this chapter, firstly the setup of the experiments will be described, then the
experiment results will be presented and analyzed.
Experiment Setup
Since faulty versions of real-world XACML policies are unavailable, the
experiments rely on mutants of XACML policies. Table 6.1 shows the list of subject
policies. In order to be representative, the subject policies used for experiment varies in
size. The number of lines of XML code (LOC) ranges from 227 to 12,803. The number
of rules ranges from 12 to 640. Continue is an access control policy for a conference
management system [19]; fedora is “an open source repository system for the
management and dissemination of digital content”; itrust is “a medical application that
provides patients with a means to keep up with their medical history and records as well
as communicate with their doctors”. itrustX (X=5, 10) are expanded versions of itrust
[20]. They have X times as many rules as itrust. The sizes of the policy files are believed
to be a good representation of real-world applications because a very large policy is often
decomposed into a number of manageable policy files.
The original subject policies are considered to be the correct version. The tests are
generated automatically from the original policies by the XPA tool using the MC/DC
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criterion. For each test, its oracle value is the actual response to the access request
produced by the original policy. The mutants of each policy are also generated
automatically by the XPA tool. Each mutant is a variation of the original policy with one
or two faults seeded using the mutation operators in Table 4.3.
Note that mutation analysis is a common approach to the evaluation of software
testing and debugging techniques. Program mutation has the following hypotheses:
a. Mutants are based on actual fault models and are representative of real
faults
b. Programs written by developers are close to being correct. This is known
as the competent programmer hypothesis [21]
c. Tests that detect simple faults are also capable of detecting complex faults.
This is known as the coupling effect hypothesis [22].
Empirical studies have confirmed that program mutants are indeed similar to real
faults for evaluating testing techniques [23] [24]. We believe that the competent
programmer hypothesis and the coupling effect hypothesis are also applicable to
XACML policies. The mutants in Table 6.1 are representative of real faults because
mutation operators are defined over an actual fault model of XACML policies [14].
Table 6.1
Subject
Policy
continue
fedora
itrust
itrust5
itrust10

Subject policies, tests, and mutants
LOC
229
227
1,283
6,403
12,803

No. of
rules
15
12
64
320
640

No. of
tests
27
31
197
983
1,965

Single fault
mutants
75
74
324
163
328

Two-fault
mutants
5,625
5,471
972
N/A
N/A
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The mutants are created by applying the mutation operators in Table 4.3 to the
correct subject policies. Table 6.1 only includes non-equivalent mutants. An equivalent
mutant has the same behavior as the original policy -- no failure would be reported when
it is executed against the given test suite. Thus, the policy repair problem is not
applicable to equivalent mutants. Note that the number of two-fault mutants grows
quickly with the increase of policy size due to the combinations of mutation operators.
The XPA tool is unable to complete the generation of all two-fault mutants for itrust5 or
itrust10 because of memory and disk space constraints. Due to the large number of
mutants, our experiments randomly selected 1% of the two-fault mutants of itrust, and
10% of the single fault mutants of itrust5 and itrust10.
Experiment Results and Analysis
The proposed approach is able to repair all mutants in Table 6.1, as the mutation
operators in Table 4.3 are reversible – a mutant created by one operator can be mutated
back to the original by the same or another mutation operator.
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 show the average repair time of single fault mutants and
two-fault mutants, respectively. “Random” refers to the scoring method that ranks all
policy elements in a random fashion. It is used as a baseline method for identifying
suspicious elements.
For a small policy like continue, the performance difference between different
scoring methods is small, but for large policies the difference is significant. For example,
for the subject policy itrust10, the best scoring method, CBI-Inc, is about 4 times faster
than Tarantula, and almost 14 times faster than the random method. This is because larger
policies have more policy elements so the benefits of a better ranking (a ranking in which
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the faulty policy element is at the top) is more obvious. Thus for a real world XACML
policy, the choice of scoring method is crucial to the performance of automated repair.
And by comparing Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 we can also see that repair time grows much
faster with the number of faults than with the number of rules, as the number of mutants
to be examined grows polynomially with the number of rules, but exponentially with the
number of faults.
Table 6.2

Repair time of single fault mutants (in seconds)
fedora
0.073

itrust

itrust5

itrust10

CBI-Inc

continue
0.053

0.496

14.813

77.165

Naish2

0.056

0.079

0.558

14.926

79.827

Sokal

0.1

0.109

0.645

23.988

124.178

Tarantula

0.051

0.068

1.367

53.517

370.067

Random

0.111

0.213

4.409

162.251

1149.35

Table 6.3

Repair time of two-fault mutants (in seconds)
continue

fedora

itrust

CBI-Inc

0.539

0.371

6.659

Naish2

0.531

0.466

9.435

Sokal

2.240

1.042

15.265

Tarantula

0.497

0.418

46.831

Random

1.298

2.257

100.705

Figure 6.1 shows the cumulative distributions of repair time of single fault
mutants for itrust and itrust5. The x-axis stands for how much time it takes at most to
repair a mutant. The y-axis stands for the percentage of mutants that can be repaired
within a certain time. All mutants can be repaired eventually, so all curves eventually
approach 1.0. The steeper the curve is, the shorter time it takes to repair the mutants on
average.
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For itrust mutants (on the left), nearly 20% can be repaired instantly. Most of
them can be repaired in 715 milliseconds using a non-random scoring method. CBI-Inc
and Naish2 are the most efficient. About 97% mutants can be repaired in 715
milliseconds. Using Tarantula, more than 80% of mutants can be repaired in 715
milliseconds. However, it takes 8 times more time to achieve the 80% repair rate when
the policy elements are ranked randomly.

Figure 6.1

Cumulative distribution of repair time of itrust and itrust5 mutants

For itrust5 mutants (on the right), most of them can be repaired in about 13
seconds. CBI-Inc and Naish2 have almost the same performance. Within 13 seconds,
both can achieve nearly 95% repair rate, while Sokal can repair more than 90% mutants
and Tarantula can repair about 75%. Thus if timeout is set to be 13 seconds, the
probability of fixing a faulty policy within the cutoff time is nearly 95%.
In brief, if a mutant can be fixed, a more efficient scoring method will make the
faulty elements appear higher in the suspicion rankings.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS
In this paper an approach to automatic repair of XACML policies is presented. It
first ranks suspicious policy elements according to the test execution information and
then attempts to mutate suspicious policy elements to make all tests pass. The proposed
approach also provides several scoring methods for suspicion ranking of policy elements.
They are an important factor in the overall time performance of automatic policy repair,
especially for policies of large size. The empirical studies show that our approach can
automatically repair faulty policies with one or two injected faults and that, among the
scoring methods, Naish2 and CBI-Inc have the best time performance.
This work offers the first yet promising attempt to develop techniques for
automatic repair of XACML policies although the current empirical studies are inherently
limited due to the general unavailability of real faults in real-world XACML policies and
the use of policy mutants with only one or two seeded faults. Nevertheless, more efficient
mutation-based repair techniques can be developed to deal with the search space problem
for large XACML policies with a number of faults. It is worth pointing out that automatic
repair is not meant to replace manual debugging of complex policies but to provide useful
hints on suspicious elements and potential fixes.
In this paper, the use of MC/DC test suite of XACML policy is thought to be
critical for the approach to be able to successfully repair the mutants with seeded faults.
For a real-world faulty policy under debugging, however, the test suite may not be
MC/DC adequate. Future research may focus on how the coverage and size of test suite
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affects the success rate of automatic repair. To reduce the search space of mutation-based
repair, future research may also investigate coarse-grained mutation operators. The
current mutation operators in the proposed approach only make a small primitive change
at a time. A coarse-grained mutation can make multiple primitive changes. To do so,
further research can investigate typical patterns of policy target, rule targets, rule
conditions in real-world XACML policies and define coarse-grained mutation operators
with respect to these patterns.
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APPENDIX A
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A.1 KmarketBluePolicy
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
PolicyId="KmarketBluePolicy"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:rule-combining-algorithm:denyoverrides" Version="1.0">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">blue</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator AttributeId="http://kmarket.com/id/role"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" />
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
<Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="total-amount">
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greaterthan">
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-oneand-only">
<AttributeDesignator AttributeId="http://kmarket.com/id/totalAmount"
Category="http://kmarket.com/category"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer" MustBePresent="true" />
</Apply>
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">100</AttributeValue>
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</Apply>
</Condition>
<AdviceExpressions>
<AdviceExpression AdviceId="deny-liquor-medicine-advice"
AppliesTo="Deny">
<AttributeAssignmentExpression
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:attribute:text">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">You are not allowed to do
more than $100 purchase
from KMarket on-line trading system</AttributeValue>
</AttributeAssignmentExpression>
</AdviceExpression>
</AdviceExpressions>
</Rule>
<Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="deny-liquor-medicine">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Liquor</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" />
</Match>
</AllOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Medicine</AttributeValue>
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<AttributeDesignator
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" />
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
<AdviceExpressions>
<AdviceExpression AdviceId="deny-liquor-medicine-advice"
AppliesTo="Deny">
<AttributeAssignmentExpression
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:attribute:text">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">You are not allowed to buy
Liquor or Medicine
from KMarket on-line trading system</AttributeValue>
</AttributeAssignmentExpression>
</AdviceExpression>
</AdviceExpressions>
</Rule>
<Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="max-drink-amount">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Drink</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" />
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</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greaterthan">
<Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-oneand-only">
<AttributeDesignator AttributeId="http://kmarket.com/id/amount"
Category="http://kmarket.com/category"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer" MustBePresent="true" />
</Apply>
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">10</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
</Condition>
<AdviceExpressions>
<AdviceExpression AdviceId="max-drink-amount-advice" AppliesTo="Deny">
<AttributeAssignmentExpression
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:attribute:text">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">You are not allowed to buy
more tha 10 Drinks
from KMarket on-line trading system</AttributeValue>
</AttributeAssignmentExpression>
</AdviceExpression>
</AdviceExpressions>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="permit-rule" Effect="Permit" />

</Policy>
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A.2 A Sample Request for KmarketBluePolicy
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
CombinedDecision="false" ReturnPolicyIdList="false">
<Attributes Category="http://kmarket.com/category">
<Attribute AttributeId="http://kmarket.com/id/totalAmount"
IncludeInResult="false">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">0</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
<Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attributecategory:resource">
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
IncludeInResult="false">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">k</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
<Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:accesssubject">
<Attribute AttributeId="http://kmarket.com/id/role"
IncludeInResult="false">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">blue</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
</Request>

